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MANCHESTER ARENA BOMBINGS
INTRODUCTIONIn the evening of the 22nd May 2017 in the 
Manchester Arena attendees, mainly young people, 
had just enjoyed a concert by Ariana Grande. Making 
their way through the Arena’s large foyer towards the 
exits, where many parents were waiting to collect 
their children who attended the concert, Salman 
Abedi, who entered the foyer as the concert was 
ending, detonated a bomb contained in a rucksack 
he was wearing killing 22, with 139 physically injured 
and many more suffering psychological injury. This 
was the first successful terrorist bombing using an 
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) in the UK since the 
July 7th 2005 London bombings on the Underground 
and a bus in Tavistock Square that killed 52 people 
and injured over 700. Since the cessation of violence 
of the 1968-1998 Irish Troubles that saw the Real IRA 
detonate a car bomb in Omagh on the 15th August 
1998 killing 29 (including a woman pregnant with 
twins) and injuring 220 people, the UK has been 
fortunate not to suffer many IED terrorist attacks. As 
attempts have been made in recent years to cause 
death and destruction using IEDs, vigilance against 
terrorists’ use of IEDs must be maintained. Examples 
include the Parsons Green bomb on the London 
Underground train on the 15th September 2017 that 
fortunately failed to detonate and when the New IRA 
planted a car bomb that exploded outside the Bishop 
Street Courthouse in Derry on the 20th January 2019 
that fortuitously only caused minimal damage and did 
not kill or injure anyone.
This article will examine the emergency services’ 
response to the Manchester Arena bombing by 
examining and considering the points raised in the 
Kerslake Report focusing on the actions of the police, 
ambulance and fire services following the attack. 
Here the article will assess what lessons were learnt 
regarding the emergency services’ response. The 
final part of the article will examine the conduct of 
the investigation by the Greater Manchester Police, 
assisted by the UK’s Counter-Terrorism Units and, 
regarding intelligence on Salman Abedi, the findings in 
the 2017 Anderson Report.  
IMMEDIATE EVENTS FOLLOWING THE  
EXPLOSION AT THE MANCHESTER ARENA
Following the detonation of Abedi’s IED in Manchester 
Arena’s foyer, at 22.33 hours a call was made to 
Greater Manchester Police’s (GMP) force control room 
that an explosion had occurred at the Arena. Being 
associated with Manchester’s Victoria rail station, the 
Arena comes under the control of the British Transport 
Police (BTP) and four BTP officers were deployed to 
police the Ariana Grande concert. Within 30 seconds 
of the explosion occurring they were the first officers 
at the scene. Within ten minutes they were supported 
by further BTP officers in and around the foyer. 
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Recognising the sheer scale of the explosion, the BTP 
sergeant present at the scene realised the potential 
vulnerability if there was a follow-on attack such as a 
marauding terrorist attack and or a secondary IED.
Within a short time GMP officers attended the scene 
where a GMP inspector became the police Bronze 
Commander. At any emergency or major incident, the 
emergency services deploy a Gold, Silver and Bronze 
Command structure, which for the police is:
1. Gold Command – has overall strategic command 
of the operation. They set the overarching strategy 
that all other plans must take account of;
2. Silver Command – co-ordinates individual strategies 
developed by Bronze Command to ensure 
they reflect and contribute to Gold Command’s 
overarching strategy. Silver Command must be 
operationally and occupationally competent in the 
relevant disciplines in this role;
3. Bronze Command Operations – Responsible for 
the command of a group of resources and carrying 
out functional and geographical responsibilities 
related to the tactical plan;
4. Bronze Command Firearms – Responsible for 
developing firearms strategy and ensuring their 
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tactical plans are developed and implemented 
to support it. Being a specialist knowledge role, 
operationally and occupationally, Bronze Command 
Firearms must be qualified and competent in this 
discipline.
This command structure is role, not rank, specific. 
The person taking the command role must be trained 
and have the necessary knowledge and expertise in 
the area they are carrying out that role. At the time 
the GMP inspector became Bronze Commander, 
Arena staff, BTP and GMP officers, paramedics and 
members of the public began triaging the casualties, 
using improvised stretchers to carry the injured to the 
rail station concourse into a Casualty Clearing Station.
By 22.35 hours the first GMP Armed Response 
Vehicle arrived at the scene. At that time, it was still 
not totally confirmed that an explosion occurred. Within 
minutes more Armed Response Vehicles arrived at 
the scene and by 22.51 hours twelve armed officers 
attended the scene. From the incoming information it 
was thought that even though an IED had been used, 
some of the injuries sustained by the casualties were 
gunshot wounds. This led the Bronze Command Force 
Police in the aftermath of the Manchester Arena bomb. (Source: Manchester Evening News. Image credit: Joel Goodman)     
Duty Officer to suspect that a ‘Paris-style’ attack was 
in progress. Acting on this information he declared 
that Operation PLATO contingency be deployed. 
Developed by the UK’s Home Office and emergency 
services, at the time of this attack Operation PLATO 
was the contingency plan for dealing with a marauding 
terrorist attack. A marauding terrorist attack is a 
fast-moving attack where the terrorists, armed with 
firearms, move though a location aiming to find and kill 
or injure as many people as possible.
While other agencies were notified of the declaration 
of Operation PLATO, the Northwest Ambulance 
Service and the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue 
Service (GMFRS) were not informed of this declaration. 
Declaring Operation PLATO enabled GMP to initiate 
mutual aid from neighbouring forces and within one 
hour 106 authorised firearms officers were deployed 
to assist GMP. By this time explosives detection 
search police dogs were at the scene to check for 
secondary IEDs.
In relation to the ambulance service, 56 ambulances 
and seven Rapid Response Vehicles, six Advanced 
Paramedics, three Consultant Paramedics and five 
doctors were deployed to the scene. Yorkshire and 
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West Midlands Ambulance Service provided mutual 
aid to cover the Northwest Ambulance Service’s 
core business.
In relation to Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue 
Service (GMFRS), they only received three calls 
regarding the Arena attack, one from GMP, one from 
the Ambulance Service and one from a member of the 
public. As no information was coming directly to them 
from the scene, this led to GMFRS being reliant on 
the interpretation of events GMP and the Ambulance 
Service passed onto them. GMP nominated Manchester 
Cathedral car park as the fire engines’ rendezvous 
point, which is close to the Arena. Suspecting a 
marauding terrorist attack was escalating, the Fire 
Liaison Officer feared that the Cathedral car park would 
not provide enough protection for the firefighters and 
nominated Philips Park Fire Station as the rendezvous 
point. Complicating the Fire Liaison Officer’s role was 
that he tried to speak to the GMP Force Duty Officer, 
but he could not get through to him on the phone. 
At 00.12 hours no fire service resources were at the 
scene leading to the Chief Fire Officer contacting the 
senior Northwest Ambulance Service officer, where 
they discussed what GMFRS assets were required. 
Armed Police at the scene. (Source: BBC news)    
Two hours after the attack four fire engines attended 
the scene at Victoria station entrance. Even after their 
arrival, there were further delays before the fire engine 
crews entered the Arena’s concourse.
What these facts reveal is how complex the operation 
carried out by the initial responders is and, amid the 
chaotic scenes, how vital communications between 
the various services’ responders are in providing an 
effective response. It also highlights how important 
that information passed onto the command structure 
is accurate, thereby enabling the various command 
officers to make informed decisions ensuring that 
responders’ actions are appropriate and more effective 
to what they are facing. Communications were one of 
the important issues the Kerslake Review examined 
and made a number of recommendations on. 
KERSLAKE REPORT 1
A former Head of the Civil Service and President of 
the Local Government Association, Lord Kerslake 
and a team of four qualified panel members carried 
out the independent review into the Manchester 
Arena bombing. Many recommendations were made 
covering a wide remit of roles including health and 
social care partnership, family liaison and support, 
community resilience, the media and mental health 
support. Focusing on the recommendations regarding 
the emergency services’ response they included: 
1. All Fire Rescue Services utilising the Northwest 
Fire Control Room (which is a separate agency to 
the fire rescue services) build contingencies and 
capabilities to enhance the development of multi-
agency situational awareness;
2. Messages should be shared directly between 
partner agencies’ control rooms immediately upon 
receipt of a message from the incident scene.
This came out of two issues, one in relation to 
the communication failure between GMFRS and 
the Northwest Fire Control. Also, the Report was 
concerned that police and ambulance service cultures 
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have developed differently from the fire service. While 
the former have greater autonomy to carry out their 
duties, firefighters are much more defined by their 
position as part of a team and adherence to protocol 
based over decades to ensure the safety of firefighters.
Regarding communications, the Report recom-
mended that agencies should explore the use 
of encrypted social media to improve the initial 
emergency arrangements, together with the 
internal communications systems for updating staff 
in an emergency. There are two reasons for this 
recommendation, one being to monitor social media 
in order to respond via their own social media to 
inaccuracies and ‘warn and inform’ by promoting and 
passing on their own, accurate messages. Secondly, as 
some of the official agency communications channels 
were not user friendly, unofficial means such as 
WhatsApp groups were used by emergency services 
staff during the response to the attack. The creation 
of official social media groups would enhance the 
communications during a response to a terrorist attack 
or major incident. As the Vodaphone system failed for a 
couple of hours just after the first responders attended 
the Arena, the Report recommended that to safeguard 
the future integrity of the National Aid Telephony System, 
the Home Office should secure appropriate guarantees 
from the company Vodaphone to ensure the necessary 
fall-back and disaster recovery arrangements are in 
place to address the failures that occurred.
The Report recommended Operation PLATO be 
reviewed and modified to cover any form of terrorist 
attack. The Report saw that a strict adherence to the 
relationship between a marauding terrorist firearms 
attack and Operation PLATO can lead to confusion, 
a lack of common situational awareness or can inhibit 
the dynamic application of capabilities to deal with 
the critical situation presented to the responders. 
Consequently, Operation PLATO was modified to 
include contingency plans for responses to terrorist 
attacks where sharply bladed weapons, vehicles, 
explosives or firearms are used.
1  Report by Lord Kerslake on the Review into the Manchester Arena Attack 
  https://www.kerslakearenareview.co.uk/media/1022/kerslake_arena_review_printed_final.pdf
 
    
POLICE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ARENA ATTACK
Following the Arena attack the UK terrorist threat level 
went to level four, which is critical where it is believed 
an attack is imminent. Although Salman Abedi died 
when he triggered the IED, knowing that knowledge 
and experience in the use of explosives are required, 
the detectives investigating the attack reasonably 
believed that Abedi had help and support from others. 
It was found Abedi had assistance from his brother 
Hashem Abedi who was living in Libya with the 
brothers’ parents. This led to the terrorist threat level 
being lowered to severe where an attack is highly likely.
As revealed during Hashem Abedi’s trial in 2020, 
the brothers planned the attack in January 2017 
when they purchased nuts and screws to act as 
shrapnel and ordered chemicals from Amazon. The 
chemicals were used to make TATP (Triacetone 
Triperoxide often referred to as acetone peroxide) 
explosives and is an explosive made from commonly 
available ingredients. Being surveillance conscious, 
the Abedi brothers regularly switched mobile phones 
(eleven in five months) and used several vehicles to 
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transport components around 
Manchester. They leased two 
addresses away from the 
family home in Fallowfield, 
Manchester. One of the 
addresses was used to take 
delivery of components they 
ordered, with the second 
address used as a bomb 
making factory. In April 2017 
the brothers’ parents insisted 
they join them in Libya. This 
forced the brothers to stockpile 
their stash in a second-hand 
Nissan Micra they purchased 
before joining their parents 
in Libya. Later that month 
Salman Abedi returned alone 
to Manchester where he rented 
a flat in central Manchester, bought a rucksack, more 
shrapnel and constructed the bomb in the flat. During 
the investigation, Hashem Abedi’s fingerprints were 
found at the addresses of the premises they used, 
and, in the Nissan Micra, that still contained traces 
of the explosives used in the attack. One problem for 
the investigators  due to the ongoing civil war in Libya, 
was getting Hashem Abedi extradited from the country. 
Although Libyan militiamen arrested him in 2017, 
Hashem Abedi’s extradition was achieved in 2019 
and in 2020 he was found guilty of terrorist offences 
and the murder of the 22 victims killed in the attack. In 
August 2020 he began serving a custodial sentence 
after being sentenced to serve a minimum of 55 years 
before being eligible for parole.
ANDERSON 2017 INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND 
INTELLIGENCE ON SALMAN ABEDI 2
In 2017 the former independent reviewer of terrorism 
legislation, David Anderson QC, was requested by the 
Home Secretary to conduct an independent review into 
the 2017 terrorist attacks in London and Manchester 
Salman Abedi minutes before he detonated the bomb that killed 22 people at 
Manchester Arena. (Source: Daily Star. Image credit: PA)    
1  Report by Lord Kerslake on the Review into the Manchester Arena Attack 
  https://www.kerslakearenareview.co.uk/media/1022/kerslake_arena_review_printed_final.pdf
 
    
2  Attacks in London and Manchester, March-June 2017, Independent Assessment of MI5 and police internal reviews by David 
Anderson Q.C https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/664682/
Attacks_in_London_and_Manchester_Open_Report.pdf 
with the remit to ascertain what was known about the 
attackers prior to the attacks and review assessments 
and decisions made on the attackers by the security 
services and the police. Being a closed subject of 
interest (SOI) at the time of the Arena attack, Salman 
Abedi was not under close investigation. He had a 
criminal record for theft and handling stolen goods, 
but nothing terrorist related. Based on supposed 
contact with an Islamic State figure, in October 
2015 he became an SOI, but as the contact was not 
direct, he became a closed SOI. In the months prior 
to the attack intelligence was received on Abedi, the 
significance of which MI5 did not appreciate at the 
time, but they arranged a meeting to be held on the 
31st May 2017. Before they could make any decision 
on Abedi, unfortunately, the attack happened on the 
22nd May. Whether more could have been done to 
stop the attack, Anderson concluded there is a high 
degree of uncertainty in speculating as to what might or 
might not have happened. He did add that on his return 
to the UK in April 2017 an opportunity was missed by 
MI5 to place Abedi on a ports action as it would have 
enabled him to have been questioned and searched 
at the airport by counter-terrorism detectives under a 
Schedule 7 Terrorism Act 2000 port stop.
CONCLUSION
A terrorist attack results in a traumatic and chaotic 
scene that emergency services face and deal with. This 
was evident in the Manchester Arena attack, especially 
as most of the victims were under the age of 14 years. 
This article does not aim to denigrate the emergency 
services’ response, conversely, as recognised in 
the Kerslake Report, many good procedures were 
conducted that night. This is about lessons learned and 
key ones, as covered in the Kerslake Report, centred 
on improving communications, improving the accuracy 
of information and reform of Operation PLATO, which 
have all been addressed. In relation to the investigation, 
being known or on intelligence systems is a criticism 
raised, especially by the media following an attack. 
Salman Abedi was a closed SOI and even though 
MI5 thought his actions prior to the attack warranted 
a meeting to discuss the threat he posed, as the 
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Anderson Review found, hindsight is a wonderful thing 
and one cannot state categorically that if the meeting 
was held earlier it would have prevented the attack. 
To end on a positive note, the police investigation was 
complex, compounded by Hashem Abedi having to 
be extradited from Libya. The tenacity demonstrated 
by GMP and the National Counter-Terrorism Units, 
along with the Crown Prosecution Service prevailed, 
resulting in his conviction and 55-year minimum prison 
sentence. 
In September 2020 the Public Inquiry into the 
Manchester Arena bombing commenced. Chaired by 
Sir John Saunders at Manchester Magistrates’ Court, 
the inquiry will have a wider scope than the Kerslake 
review, with a focus on exploring the circumstances 
leading up to and surrounding the attack. No doubt 
the issues raised here regarding the communications 
issue and MI5’s intelligence on Salman Abedi will be 
revisited. It will be interesting to see if the Public Inquiry 
makes further recommendations regarding intelligence 
on SOI’s, even if they are closed SOI’s, and the 
emergency services’ response to terrorist incidents. 
While it is easy to criticise aspects, as the Kerslake 
Report revealed there were many examples of good 
practice carried out and should a similar attack occur in 
the future, assisting our emergency services is a more 
constructive response that we can all take. ■
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